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JURISDICTION
1 hr, i" nuii has ]un aliehon i»\ci this appeal pursuaiii in- Utah Code Ann. §78-2a3(2)(k) (1993).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the district court correct in granting Armour of America ("Armour") and

E. I DuPont de Nemours ("DuPont") summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs failure to
\ aim siainis against llieirni on the basis that no alleged failure to warn by either of them,
caused the death of

* reddie Floyd House '"T \ House").

2

mour and DuPont summary

judgment dismissing plaintiffs failure to warn claims against them on the basis that neither
of them had duties to warn as alleged by the plaintiff.
3.

Was the district court correct in granting Armour and DuPont summary

judgment dismissing plaintiffs failure to warn claims against them on the basis tlla i (Iic\ each
Si-* -^

have had.
4.

Was the district court correct in granting DuPont summary judgment

dismissing plaintiff s failuir to wain . lanii j^aiusl it -in ihc ' \,isis llial il had na duty to warn.
The standard of review for each of these four summary judgment issues is whether
there was a genuine issue of material fact vJiiah would imvlikk: judgment tlieivoii as a
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d 838, 840
(Utah App. 1987).

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Ann C. House was the wife of Lt, Fred House, a Utah Department of
Corrections officer, who was killed during a siege at Marion, Utah, on January 28, 1988.
At the time of his death, Lt. House was wearing a bullet-resistant tactical vest which
consisted of soft body armor made of layers of ballistic fabric woven from Kevlar® fiber and
a hard armor ceramic panel inserted in a front pocket. Lt. House was tragically killed when
the soft body armor portion of his tactical vest, which was made to stop most common
handgun bullets, was penetrated by a rifle bullet that struck the nonceramic rear edge but
missed the ceramic front of his hard armor ceramic panel which was made to stop rifle
bullets. Plaintiff brought this wrongful death action against Armour which manufactured the
vest; Lawco Police Supply ("Lawco") which sold the vest to the Department of Corrections;
and DuPont which developed and manufactured the Kevlar® fiber.
After several years of extensive pleadings and extended discovery which produced a
large number of documents and included the depositions of twenty individuals, the parties
jointly submitted an Initial Pretrial Order ("IPTO") pursuant to the Management and
Scheduling Order of the district court which contained the claims of the parties, thirty
paragraphs of uncontested facts and the contested issues. Soon after this submission, which
refined the issues and produced agreement on many of the material facts, the defendants
filed motions for summary judgment that principally relied on the uncontested facts set forth
in the IPTO supplemented by certain undisputed documents and deposition testimony.
In this case, plaintiff did not claim any defect in the material, design or manufacture
of Lt. House's tactical vest. Rather, she claimed that the vest was defective because

2

necessary warnings were not given concerning die vesi's pioteetion limitations

PLiintiff

cLiiiTiccI llul Armour, as vest manufacturer, and Lawco, as vest seller, each had a specific
duty to warn I t, House, and that DuPont, as a promoter of the use of Kevlar®-based vests
Jut),i general tlut\ ^ *um "11 poli<v officers that soft body armor will not stop rifle fire and
that an officer should do nothing with his vest on that he would not do without it. Plaintiff
claimed that the defendants" failure to give these warnings eaused Ll House to knowingly
expose himself to the gunfire which resulted in his death. Addendum (Add.) Ex. 1, IPTO
R. 1277.
Armour claimed that law enforcement officers who acquire and wear soft body armor
are informed and know that it will not stop rifle fire and that only hard armor inserts like
use's et num.' pairl are capable of stopping rifle fire. Armour claimed that the label
that was attached to Lt. House's vest indicated that the soft body armor would only protect
against some handguns andbuckshoi and dial; ,i brochure which accompanied the vest made
clear that higher velocity rifle fire protection was provided only by the hard armor ceramic
chest panel. Armour claimed that it had no duty to give ainformation i

:

iJJilion d. dial, contained in its brochure and label and that no alleged

failure to warn caused Lt. House's death. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO P. 1273,
DuP'oni eiaiiih, d iLii while il provided die Kevlar® JCI to a weaver who wove the
fiber into the ballistic fabric utilized in Lt, House's vest's soft body armor, Armour was
responsible for the ballistic fabric weave specification and number of laveis of the soft body
armor, the composition and structure of the hard armor ceramic panel, the design and
manufacture of the vest and the information provided on die label nf the vest and in die
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Armour brochure that accompanied the vest. DuPont claimed that it had no duty and no
opportunity to provide information or warnings to Lt. House or directly to any other
purchaser or wearer of soft body armor made of fabrics woven from Kevlar® fiber. DuPont
claimed that all of the information that it has disseminated about Kevlar® and soft body
armor made of Kevlar® fiber has been accurate in all respects and has made clear that while
soft body armor containing Kevlar® fiber is constructed to resist the penetration of certain
handgun bullets, it cannot provide protection from rifle fire such as that which killed Lt.
House. Finally, both Armour and DuPont claimed that Lt. House knew that only his hard
armor ceramic chest panel provided rifle protection and that there is no evidence that Lt.
House exposed himself to rifle fire because of a mistaken belief that the soft body armor of
his vest would protect him from it. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO R. 1279-81.
The district court, after considering lengthy memoranda and extended oral argument
on the summary judgment motions, found that there was no genuine issue as to any material
fact and all defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of plaintiffs
claims. Because the motions were based on multiple grounds, each of which would justify
summary judgment dismissing the failure to warn claims, the court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a), set forth the following four grounds for its decision:
(a) No alleged failure to warn by any of the defendants caused Lt. House's death;
(b) None of the defendants had duties to warn as alleged by the plaintiff;
(c) Each of the defendants satisfied any duties to warn that they may have had;
(d) DuPont had no duty to warn.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1
The Defendants
1.

Armour is in the business of designing, manufacturing, testing and selling

bullet resistant vests, which are also known as soft body armor, to provide torso protection
against handguns. Armour also designs, manufactures, tests and sells hard body armor in
the form of ceramic plates which can be inserted in pockets in some of its heavier vests to
provide protection against rifle fire. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 2, R. 1278, 1282. Armour places
a simple and succinct label in all of its vests which identified the vest's ballistic protection
level by listing the maximum or top end rounds that the vest will contain. Armour also
encloses a copy of its brochure containing detailed information regarding the capabilities of
Armour's soft body armor vests and hard body armor panels inside the plastic cover that
encases all of its new vests so that the brochure will be received by all vest purchasers. Add.
Ex. 14, Schreiber, R. 1439-40, 1452, 3584.
1

The following paragraphs of facts will be cited in the Argument as "Facts, U ."
For the convenience of the court, the record support for all appellee cited facts has been
placed in the Addendum filed herewith. The Addendum contains the following recordidentified documents (R. ) cited as parenthetically indicated: Initial Pretrial Order
(Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 ); Plaintiffs Interrogatory Responses (Add. Ex. 2, PI. Responses);
Armour brochure (Add. Ex. 3, Brochure); DuPont Facts Books (Add. Ex. 4 and 5, Facts
Book); deposition testimony of various witnesses (Add. Ex. , Name); and pages from
plaintiffs district court memorandum (Add. Ex. 20, PL Memo.)
Plaintiffs Statement of Facts principally cites plaintiffs district court
memorandum, R. 1507-61, and contains many contentions which are contrary to the
undisputed facts or have no evidentiary support. It also includes allegations which have
no relevance, i.e., those regarding the effects of wetness, angle, edge or multiple shots
on a bullet-resistant vest. Plaintiffs Brief (PI. Br.) at 15. Lt. House's vest was not wet
and the bullet did not strike at an angle or near the edge of the vest or any other bullet
hole. Add. Ex. 2, PL Responses, R. 1315-20. Also irrelevant are the contentions about
.30 caliber carbine rifle fire at 70 yards (PL Br. 31, 35, 36) for it is undisputed that the
rifle fire from the Singer house was unanticipated. Add. Ex. 20, PL Memo., R. 1541.
5

2.

Lawco was in the business of selling police supplies including bullet resistant

vests manufactured by several different body armor manufacturers. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 4,
R. 1279. Armour provided Lawco with information and brochures concerning Armour vests
so that Lawco could convey the information and brochures to prospective customers. (Add.
Ex. 14, Schreiber, R. 1439-40; Add. Ex. 17, Carlson, R. 1784-85; Add. Ex. 15, Wadman, R.
1461-62).
3.

DuPont developed, manufactures and sells Kevlar® which is a DuPont

registered trademark for a family of aramid fibers that are utilized in many ways, including
being woven into ballistic fabric used in bullet resistant vests that can stop bullets from
handguns but not higher velocity bullets from rifles. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 5, R. 1283-84.
Kevlar® fibers were developed during the late 1960's and first marketed in 1972 as
reinforcement material in tires, belts and hoses. DuPont did not develop Kevlar® for body
armor and has never designed or manufactured body armor. However, a number of other
companies, like Armour, recognized the potential of Kevlar® in body armor. By the mid1970's these companies, using fabrics woven from Kevlar® fiber, were able to make light
concealable soft body armor commercially available for the first time. Designed to stop
bullets fired from most common handguns and notably lighter in weight than earlier ballistic
apparel, vests containing Kevlar® provide police officers with an effective body armor that
is inconspicuous under the uniform and comfortable enough to wear routinely on an
everyday basis in all climates. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 6, R. 1284.
4.

In June 1981 Armour sold to Lawco ten bullet resistant vests, one non-

concealable Armour-Hide + P ("AHP") tactical soft body armor vest with a hard armor
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ceramic chest panel and nine concealable AHP soft body armor vests without inserts, for
immediate resale by Lawco to the State of Utah Department of Corrections for use by the
Utah State Prison's two Tactical Squads. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 3, R. 1282-83. Lt. House was
issued the tactical vest with the insertable hard armor ceramic chest panel providing
additional protection because he was then the point man of the Utah Prison's five man entry
team. The other members of the Tactical Squads were issued the nine concealable soft body
armor vests without panel inserts. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 24, R. 1293.
5.

The ten Armour vests all had a label attached which stated:
THIS VEST WILL CONTAIN
44 MAG. 240 GR. (6H BBL)
U.S.A. 9mm 124 GR. FMJ
357 MAG. 125 GR. SJHP (6" BBL)
22 MAG. (6" BBL) 38 CAL 00 BUCKSHOT
NOT FOR A.P. ROUNDS
ARMOUR OF AMERICA
P.O. BOX 1405
BEVERLY HILLS, CA 90213

DO NOT MACHINE WASH OR DRY CLEAN.
CLEAN WITH DAMP CLOTH AND SMALL
AMOUNT OF SOAP.

Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 3, R. 1246. All the rounds listed on this label are handgun rounds,
except for the buckshot, which is fired from a shotgun. Add. Ex. 14, Schreiber, R. 1444-45,
3584-85.
The Marion Standoff and Shooting of Lt. House
6.

On January 28, 1988, Lt. House was shot and killed while assisting in the

apprehension of suspects who had bombed a chapel in Marion, Utah, and thereafter
barricaded themselves in the Vickie Singer home in the compound of the Singer/Swapp
polygamist group. A 13-day standoff ensued between the suspects and law enforcement
officers from a number of agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"),

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Utah Department of Public Safety.
Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 25, R. 1293-94.
7.

Lt. House was wearing his Armour tactical vest with the hard armor ceramic

chest panel inserted in the front pocket when he was killed by a .30 caliber steel jacketed
round fired from a Plainfield carbine rifle by Timothy Singer. The round struck the nonceramic inside edge of the chest panel and then penetrated through the soft body armor
portion of the vest, perforating Lt. House's aorta and causing his death. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO
11 26, R. 1294.
8.

At the beginning of the standoff, the Department of Corrections was requested

to send canine officers and their dogs to Marion to assist the federal and state law
enforcement officers. There was concern that the suspects, who were known to have
explosives, might try to throw dynamite or some other explosive into the homes occupied by
the law enforcement officers. In such an event, the dogs would be sent out to stop them
before they could do so. Lt. House and Correctional Officers Jerry Pope and Cliff Cardall
and their dogs took turns providing this canine protection. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 27, R. 1294.
9.

After the standoff had continued for some 10 days, a plan utilizing two of the

canine officers' dogs was devised to capture Addam and Jonathan Swapp, the primary
suspects in the church bombing. The FBI teams set up and activated bright lights and sound
equipment to induce the Swapp brothers to come out of the barricaded Singer home to
destroy the equipment at which time the dogs would be sent to subdue them. This plan was
implemented at approximately 1:00 a.m. on January 28,1988, with Officers Pope and Cardall
and their dogs, but the dogs could not locate the suspects and the plan failed. Add. Ex. 1,
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IPTO 11 28, R. 1294-95.
10.

Following that unsuccessful attempt, law enforcement officials devised an

alternative plan which would also use the dogs. Each morning during the siege, Addam and
Jonathan Swapp had been observed leaving the barricaded residence and going to a goat pen
where they obtained goat milk for family members in the Singer home. The plan called for
Lt. House, Officer Pope, and some FBI Hostage Rescue Team members to secret
themselves inside the "Green" house located some 70 yards from the barricaded home and
in close proximity to the goat pen. When the two suspects made their morning trip to the
goat pen, Lt. House and Officer Pope were to send their dogs out of the front door of the
"Green" house to subdue them and then get out of the front entryway and under cover as
quickly as possible so the Hostage Rescue Team members behind them could cover the
Swapp brothers with their weapons. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 29, R. 1295; Add. Ex. 12, Pope,
R. 1408-09.
11.

At approximately 8:30 a.m. on January 28, 1988, the Swapps walked to the

goat pen. As they were returning to their home, orders were given to implement the new
plan. Lt. House opened the front door which faced the barricaded Singer home and he and
Officer Pope alerted and released their dogs. Almost instantaneously, rifle shots were fired
by Timothy Singer from the barricaded home through the open doorway and into the
entryway where Lt. House, Officer Pope and several FBI agents were located. All of the
officers sought cover, but Lt. House was killed by one of the first rounds. FBI agents within
the home returned fire, wounding Addam Swapp. Shortly thereafter, the Singer/Swapp clan
surrendered and the siege ended. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 30, R. 1296.
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12.

Timothy Singer told law enforcement officers that he was aiming at the dogs,

not at the officers. An examination of the sights on Timothy Singer's rifle revealed that they
were not properly set and that at a distance of 75 yards, a fired bullet would impact some
14-15 inches above the point of aim. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 30, R. 1296.
13.

During the execution of the plan which led up to Lt. House's death, Officer

Pope did not see Lt. House doing anything before he was shot that deviated from the plan
as Officer Pope understood it. Add. Ex. 12, Pope, R. 1423. Neither Lt. House, Officer
Pope nor any other officer involved in the arrest plan knowingly exposed themselves to rifle
fire. Add. Ex. 8, T. House, R. 1383-84. Lt. House, Officer Pope, and the FBI Hostage
Rescue Team members, who were in the entryway, were all exposed to the sudden
unexpected rifle fire. Add. Ex. 12, Pope, R. 1413-14, 1416-17.
14.

At the time of Lt. House's death, Officer Pope was wearing a concealable soft

body armor vest without a ceramic plate, which he knew would not protect him from rifle
fire. Before buying this vest in 1986, Officer Pope had investigated body armor and learned
that there were different threat protection levels of vests, that soft armor would not stop a
rifle round, and that this was why people bought the strike plates like Lt. House's ceramic
insert for such higher threat levels. Officer Pope had received a copy of the DuPont Body
Armor Facts Book, "Dress For Survival," with his vest. Add. Ex. 12, Pope, R. 1411,1419-20,
1422; Add. Ex. 5, Facts Book, R. 1337-48.
Lt. House and His Tactical Vest
15.

Lt. House began working as a corrections officer for the Utah State

Department of Corrections in 1973.

By 1988, Lt. House was a highly trained law
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enforcement officer. He was also a Category I Firearms Instructor. In addition to his
corrections and police officer training, Lt. House attended numerous Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) training courses, police dog handler courses, Officer Survival seminars, and
other Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) approved courses. The following reflect
some of the POST approved training which Lt. House completed:
Basic Corrections Academy Training

9/9/74 - 9/20/74

Corrections Pistol Training

9/24/74

SWAT Training with Salt Lake Police Department

7/3/80

Firearms Instructors Course

7/17/81

Corrections SWAT Training

9/14/82, 12/7/82, 6/26/86, 9/4/86, 10/30/86 & 11/24/86

Police Service Dog Handler's Course

11/1/82 - 2/25/83

Officer Survival

11/16/82

Corrections SWAT Handguns Training

12/14/82

Officer Survival Seminar

9/13/83

Instructor Development

6/12/84 - 7/18/84

Canadian National Police Canine Association Seminar
and Police Service Dog Competition

8/10/84 - 8/12/84

POLIZEISCHUTZHUNDPRUEFUNG Canine Mini-Course (Denver)
Corrections Canine Training

9/3/84 - 9/7/84

7/18/85, 7/20/85 & 9/18/86

Canadian Police Dog Training (Calgary, Alberta)
Officer Survival Seminar

8/6/85
6/13/85

Category I Police Academy Certification
Police Service Dog Training
Canine Law Enforcement Instructor Course (Tuscaloosa, Alabama)

1/5/87 - 3/20/87
8/31/87 - 9/4/87
9/87 - 12/87

Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 22, R. 1292.
16.

In 1980, Lt. House and the other members of the Utah Prison's Tactical

Squads, all of whom were weapons instructors, determined that they needed to obtain bullet
resistant vests. The members of these two squads began researching body armor and
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contacting body armor retailers and manufacturers to obtain literature on bullet resistant
vests. They also had sales representatives visit the Prison to provide them with body armor
information including brochures and catalogs and to demonstrate bullet resistant vests. The
Tactical Squad members learned that the vests came in a number of different styles, each
with different threat protection levels, but that they were generally of two types: concealable
vests for wear under an officer's outer clothing, and larger non-concealable tactical vests.
The Tactical Squads' body armor investigation developed a consensus on what vests the
Squad members wanted and ultimately resulted in the purchase from Lawco in June 1981
of the nine Armour AHP concealable vests and the one Armour AHP tactical vest with the
hard armor ceramic insert. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 23, R. 1292-93.
17.

The Tactical Squad members obtained brochures from every body armor

manufacturer, including Armour, and relied on the information in the brochures and on the
product demonstrations and information given to them by vest distributors and sales
representatives. Add. Ex. 11, Minor, R. 1399, 1401; Add. Ex. 6, Bartell, R. 1352. Squad
members knew from the information supplied to them that the soft body armor vests would
not stop rifle fire and that only Lt. House's ceramic plate would stop rifle fire. Add. Ex. 6,
Bartell, R. 1357-59; Add. Ex. 7, Billings, R. 1367-68; Add. Ex. 11, Minor, R. 2776-77; Add.
Ex. 9, L. Jorgensen, R. 1387-88. Several Tactical Squad members in fact testified that Lt.
House told them that his ceramic plate was necessary to stop rifle fire. Add. Ex. 9, L.
Jorgensen, R. 1388-89; Add. Ex. 11, Minor, R. 2776-77; Add. Ex. 6, Bartell, R. 1360-61.
18.

Lt. House was one of the main players in acquiring information about body

armor vests and in convincing the Warden of the Prison to authorize the purchase from
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Lawco of the ten Armour bullet resistant vests foi the 1 actical Squads. Add Ex. 8, T.
House,

788; Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 24, R. 1293. The Tactical Squads' representatives

explained to the Warden the need for the vests, presented him with the vest manufacturers'
brochures, and had ;i vest representative display a vest and describe what it would do. Add.
Ex. 13, Roberts, R. 1428-29.
.19.

Armoui »okl "', Liwothe one Mil31 iaelir.i' \ rsf weighing 6 lbs. for $320.00,

and the 10" x 12" hard armor ceramic chest panel weighing over 6 lbs. for $180.00. The nine
concealable AHP soft body armor vests without inserts i lui Armour si ill 1 t< i Lawco included
three regular size each weighing 3.4 lbs and costing $130.00, five standard size each weighing
3.85 lbs. and costing $145.00 and one extra large weighing 4.7 lbs. and costing $180 ••> \dd.
Ex. 1, II'1 r o i l \ IV L'.s;

.

*

uic Department of Corrections was $750.00

for the Armour AHP tactical vest with the hard armor ceramicfrontpanel and $190.00 each
for the nine concealable AHP soft body armor vests Add Iw I IP'] O 11 4 R. 1282-83.
20.

Addendum Exhibit 3 is a true and accurate copy of the brochure Armour was

distributing in 1981 with all of its vests. Add. hx. I I Sehmbei, R M3U

I 'his brochure

describes four basic grades of soft body armor vests that Armour then manufactured and
identifies on a chart the handgun rounds that each grade protects against. See Add. Ex. 3,
Brochure, R MJ.l M HK'SP four soft bodv armor vest grades were the:
(i)

Ultra Thin for the low velocity handgun rounds indicated on the chart;

(ii)

Armour-Hide for the medium vHnrity handgun loiinds and .00 buckshot

indicated on the chart plus the lesser threats stopped by the Ultra Thin vest;
(iii)

Armour-Hide + I" {"/"VHP") Kir the higher velocity handgun and sub-
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machine gun rounds indicated on the chart together with the lesser threats stopped by the
Ultra Thin and Armour-Hide; and
(iv)

Super Armour-Hide to stop the high velocity handgun rounds and 12

gauge slug indicated on the chart plus all of the lesser threats stopped by the three lighter
vests. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 15, R. 1287-88.
21.

The stopping capacity of a soft body armor vest increases with the number of

layers of fabric woven from Kevlar® fiber which in turn increases the weight and thickness
of the vest. Thus, the Ultra Thin is the lightest, thinnest and least expensive of the four
Armour bullet resistant vests and the Super Armour-Hide is the heaviest, thickest and most
expensive. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 16, R. 1288.
22.

The Armour brochure describes Tactical and Riot Armor and explains that the

heavier and thicker Armour-Hide + P and Super Armour-Hide vests can come with a front
and back pocket for the insertion of Armour's hard armor ceramic panels which can stop
rifle fire. Add. Ex. 3, Brochure, R. 1325. A chart in the brochure identifies the different
styles of Tactical and Riot vests and the particular rounds of handgun fire the vest will
protect against and rifle fire that the hard armor panels will protect against. Add. Ex. 3,
Brochure, R. 1326.
Soft and Hard Body Armor
23.

Soft body armor constructed of layers of fabric woven from Kevlar® fiber is

durable and has exceptional ballistic resistant properties. It is constructed of multiple layers
of this woven fabric assembled into a ballistic resistant panel which is inserted into a carrier
of conventional garment fabrics, such as nylon or cotton.
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The ballistic protection is

determined by the weave and number of layers of fabric in the ballistic panel, Soft body
arniot can provide pioieciion from handguns and even 9 millimeter submachine guns.
However, it is not designed to withstand rifle fire. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 7, R. 1284-85.
24^

.,.-••

.,.

in some bullet

resistant vests to provide protection from rifle fire are made of metal, ceramic materials or
rigid reinforced plastic These panels are heavy, rigid, expensive and designed primarily for
special operations teams for use in high risk situations. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 13, R. 1287.
25.

There is no such thing as "bulletproof body armor.

It is impossible to

:onsfrud wc;jrabi<" ;iii)]ni ilm null protect against all possible threats. Moreover, body
armor, by its obvious extent and nature, provides only limited torso protection. It does not
cover and thus does mil ( fnudi: protection against bullets striking the head, neck, arms,
armpits, groin or lower extremities. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 I ; R. 1286.
26.
soaking wet,

Fabric woven from Kevlar® loses some of its ballistic resistant efficiency when
iciurns to normal ballistic efficiency upon drying.

This problem is

circumvented by using a water repellant treatment such as Zepel D fabric fluoridizer or
"Scotchgard" on the Kevlai m fabric or the fabn

•- -

• ^tected from moisture by encasing

it in a moisture proof container. Armour makes all of its vests, including Lt. House's,
waterproof by manufacturing them "w ith a i lylon cover coated on the outside with Zepel and
on the inside with a heavy coat of Urethane. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 14, R. 1287.
DuPont's Role in Soft Body Armor
27.

jut has never designed or manufactured soft or hard body armor. Add.

Ex. 1, IPTO 1118, R. 1289. DuPont sells Kevlar® fiber to weaving companies, which weave
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the fiber into ballistic fabric according to specifications from body armor manufacturers like
Armour. The manufacturers then take the fabric and produce the final products: various
bullet resistant vests providing various levels of protection. DuPont has no control over
either the intermediate step of weaving the fabric, or over the final production, testing and
sale of the vests. DuPont has no knowledge of or control over the level of protection of a
vest, the purchaser of the vest or the information and warnings provided by the
manufacturer or retailer to the purchaser with a vest. Add. Ex. 14, Schreiber, R. 1453-56.
28.

DuPont has, however, extensively tested ballistic fabrics woven from Kevlar®

fiber used in soft body armor vests and has encouraged law enforcement officers to wear
such vests. DuPont has published and widely disseminated free of charge to manufacturers
of body armor and interested law enforcement agencies and organizations thousands of
copies of body armor Facts Books each year beginning with 1985. The first Facts Book in
1985 was entitled "Kevlar® Soft Body Armor Facts Book." The DuPont Facts Book cover
and form of interior contents were changed in 1986 and each year's book thereafter followed
the 1986 Facts Book cover and interior form. These later Facts Books had front covers with
the two titles: "Kevlar® Personal Body Armor Facts Book" and "Dress for Survival." All of
the DuPont Facts Books informed the reader that soft body armor made of Kevlar® fiber
is not designed to provide protection from rifle fire because of the higher velocities of
bullets fired from these types of weapons. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 11 18, R. 1289. Addendum
Exhibits 4 and 5 are copies of the 1985 and the 1986 DuPont Facts Books, respectively.
Statements that soft body armor will not contain rifle fire are found at page 8 of the 1985
Book (Add. Ex. 4, R. 1334), and at page 3 of the 1986 Book (Add. Ex. 5, R. 1340).
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29.

DuPont has also disseminated video tapes concerning soft hmlv .innor

containing Kevlar®. The first video tape entitled "DuPont Kevlar® - Law Enforcement Your Way of Life" was made available to law enforcement in the late 1970's. The second
video tape entitled Trotirimu S<u'iely\ Prufcctois" was widely distributed without charge
in the early 1980's to police agencies, organizations and training academies, A third video
tape entitled "Knighr in Modem Aunoi" w;is produce^11 in llWe bv George Town
Productions which sold the film to interested law enforcement agencies and organizations.
DuPont acquired the rights to this video tape in 1988 and thereafter provided copies of it
without charge. All of these video tapes advised that soft body armor made of Kevlar® will
not protect against rifle fire. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO 1f 18, R. 1290.
30.

Since 1933, DuPont has been, an active i nember of the Personal Protective

Armor Association, an organization comprised mainly of manufacturers of soft body armor
made from Kevlar® fiber, I )uPoi it has placed advertisements in various police journals and
DuPont employees have written a number of articles and presented papers at seminars
encouraging the wearing of soft body armor containing Kevlar® DuPont has participated
in the development of testing standards for soft body armor containing Kevlar® and has
lobbied Federal agencies concerning the adoption of testing standards for soft body armor.
DuPont lias liiiidetl studies addressing the effect

.

-

police officers' and

management's attitude toward soft body armor. DuPont provides funding and other support
to the IACP/DulJt)iit Kevlar® Survivors Qui\ which DuPnnf sponsors with the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, and to the Vested Interest Program of the Fraternal Order
of Police Auxiliary, which promotes the wearing of body armor,

17

DuPoiit performed

extensive study and testing of used soft body armor containing fabric woven from Kevlar®
which resulted in the Rational Replacement Policy recommendations which DuPont
disseminated through articles and presentations to law enforcement agencies. Add. Ex. 1,
IPTO H 19, R. 1290-91.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff does not dispute that to avoid summary judgment she had to show sufficient
probative evidence creating triable factual issues on each of the following elements of her
failure to warn claim: (1) that a warning that the soft armor portion of Lt. House's bullet
resistant vest would not stop rifle fire was necessary to make the vest reasonably safe; (2)
that one or more of the defendants owed Lt. House a duty to warn him of this fact; (3) that
one or more of the defendants failed to perform their respective duties to so warn; (4) that
as a result of such failure, Lt. House did not know that only his hard armor ceramic insert
would stop rifle fire; and (5) that in the mistaken belief that his soft body armor would stop
rifle fire, Lt. House knowingly exposed himself to the rifle fire which caused his death.
Plaintiff could not show triable factual issues as to any of these necessary elements and, thus,
summary judgment was properly granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Plaintiff contends that Armour, the vest manufacturer, failed to fulfill its specific duty
to warn Lt. House by claiming that the only information provided to him by Armour was the
vest label which did not adequately warn that soft body armor would not stop rifle fire.
However, the uncontroverted evidence shows that (1) Armour informs retailers, like Lawco,
about the capabilities and limitations of its vests so that they can inform vest buyers and
provides them with Armour brochures containing detailed information about Armour vests
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for distribution to all prospective purchasers; (2) Armour packages brochures with all of its
vests winch, logethei n itli \"sl labels, set forth accurate and adequate information about the
threat protection level provided by Armour soft body armor and hard armor ceramic panels;
and (3) a bullet resistjinl vt:M purchaser determines the fnct^ ;ihooi a wst before buying one
in order to select the desired threat protection level.
Plaintiff claims that DuPont failed to fulfill a general duty in inform all wearers of
soft body armor, including Lt. House, that soft body armor will not stop rifle fire. According
to plaintiff, DuPont had this duty because DuPont sold the Kevlar® fiber, knowing the
limitations of the ballistic fabric it is woven into 01 that Di il:) :)iit assumed this duty because
of its activities in the soft body armor industry. PI. Br. at 33. However, the uncontroverted
facts show (1) that DuPont has no knowledge of or control o * ei the "w eaving of Kevlar® fiber
into ballistic fabric, the design and threat protection level of a vest, the purchaser of a vest
or the information provided to the purchaser; (2) that nothing DuPont did or did not do had
any thing to do witl I tl ic purchase of I t. House's vest in 1981 or his use of his vest thereafter;
(3) that most of the activities by which, according to plaintiff, DuPont "voluntarily assumed"
a duty to warn, took place years after 1 L House's vest was purchased and some even after
Lt. House's death in 1988; and (4) that the information DuPont disseminated regarding soft
body armor accurately reported that it was designed to provide protection from handgun fire
rifle fire and was not false or misleading.
Finally, the uncontroverted evidence shows that Lt. House knew that his soft body
arn

*

-top rifle fire and that he did mil knowingly expose himself to rifle fire

because of any mistaken belief in the protection provided by his tactical vest.
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ARGUMENT
I.

ARMOUR AND DuPONT WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE NO ALLEGED FAILURE TO WARN CAUSED THE DEATH OF LT.
HOUSE
A

There Is No Evidence Lt. House Knowingly Exposed Himself to Rifle Fire In
Reliance On His Vest

Soft body armor vests will protect that part of an officers torso covered by the vest
against certain handguns which are the most common street weapons. However, the
protection provided by a vest is obviously limited as there is no certainty that an officer will
not be shot in the head or some other uncovered portion of his body or by a high velocity
weapon that exceeds his vest's threat protection level. This possibility does not require any
warning that the officer should not do anything with his vest on that he would not do
without it because an officer knows that he can never be sure when or where he may be shot
or what weapon may be used against him and is trained to never expose himself
unnecessarily. Add. Ex. 8, T. House, R. 1383-84.
Plaintiff argues that Lt. House exposed himself to greater risks in reliance on his vest
than he would have if he had known the vest's limitations. PI. Br. at 41. This unsupported
generalization avoids the relevant issue: whether, on January 28,1988, Lt. House knowingly
exposed himself to rifle fire which caused his death and would not have done so if he had
known that only the ceramic plate in his vest would stop rifle fire. Plaintiff tries to avoid
this specific issue because she cannot establish this critical element of her case: that a
failure to warn was the cause in fact and proximate cause of Lt. House's death. See Conti
v. Ford Motor Co.. 743 F.2d 195, 197 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert, denied. 470 U.S. 1028 (1985).
The undisputed evidence is that (1) Lt. House's actions, together with those of Officer Pope
20

and the FBI Hostage Rescue Team members, were required by the jnest plan: (/1 hi' did
nothing that deviated from the arrest plan; (3) the only potential exposure Lt. House and
the other officers thought they had to rifle fire was from Addam and Jonathan Swapp; and
(4) fire from the Swapps w;r. not a significant threat because, although the Swappshad rifles
slung over their shoulders, they were being covered by a number of FBI Hostage Rescue
Team members.
Plaintiff does not dispute that Officer Pope, wearing a concealable vest that he knew
would not stop rifle fire, was in the entryway next to a kneeling Lt. I louse in a direct line
Willi hnth tin1 Swapps ami I he Singer home. PL Br. at 22-3. She argues that, while both
were exposed there only briefly by the arrest plan, a jury could infer that Lt. House exposed
himself more than Officer Pope because he llmuyhi fits w i \i\ntU\ protect him from a rifle
round fired by the Swapps. PL Br. at 43. While Lt. House knelt a few feet in front and to
the right of Officer Pope, both were positioned with a direct line of sight on the Swapps so
they ccraid point their dogs to their target. Add. Ex. 12, Pope, R. 1415-16. Whether Lt.
House was more exposed to the Swapps than Officer Pope is immaterial because the plan
provided protection against any fire from the Swapps, There is no evidence that Lt. House
or Officer Pope did anything on the day of Lt. House's death that was not in accordance
with the arrest plan, or that eith

. House or Officer' Pop,' knowingly exposed themselves

to any significant risk of rifle fire.2

2

Tom House, Li House's brother and another prison officer, investigated the
circumstances of Lt. House's death and concluded that none of the officers involved in
the arrest plan exposed themselves to hostile fire. He also admitted that tactical officers
are trained to minimize exposure to hostile fire to the greatest extent possible. Add. Ex.
8, T. House, R. 1383-84. See pp. 35-36.
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Plaintiffs memorandum in the district court stated fl[e]ven though the arrest plan did
not anticipate rifle fire from the Singer house, it did anticipate rifle fire from Addam and
Jonathan Swapp, who were much closer to Lt. House and the arresting officers and who
were carrying rifles." Add. Ex. 20, PL Memo., R. 1541. This is the reason the arrest plan
had Lt. House and Officer Pope taking cover immediately after releasing their dogs and FBI
officers in the entryway and upstairs in the Green house positioned with weapons trained
on the Swapps, making sure they could not fire their rifles. Add. Ex. 8, T. House, R. 1383.3
Torso vests leave critical parts of the body unprotected and no reasonable wearer
knowingly would expose himself to rifle or handgun fire in reliance on such limited torso
protection.4 In response to this obvious fact, plaintiff still contends that does not mean Lt.
House did not rely on his torso vest. But reliance in general is not the issue. The issue is
whether Lt. House took some concrete action at Marion on January 28,1988, which caused
his death that he would not have taken had he known that the soft body armor portion of
his vest would not stop rifle fire. Plaintiff admits that there is no evidence that he did, PL

3

Plaintiff erroneously contends without evidentiary support that everyone at the
siege thought his vest gave him some protection against rifle fire, even though Lt.
House's vest was the only one with a plate, PL Br. at 42, while admitting that Officer
Pope knew that his concealable vest provided no rifle fire protection. PL Br. at 14.
Furthermore, plaintiff acknowledged that the FBI officers wore tactical vests, PL Br. at
22, and there is no evidence that their tactical vests did not contain hard armor panels.
4

See Linegar v. Armour of America. 909 F.2d 1150,1154 (8th Cir. 1990) (a person
wearing a bullet resistant vest could not reasonably expect the vest to deflect bullets
aimed at his head or neck or lower abdomen or any other area not covered by the vest);
Wilson v. Bicvcle South. Inc.. 915 F.2d 1503,1507 (11th Cir. 1990) ("A person purchasing
a bullet proof vest cannot realistically claim that he expected it to protect him from a
bullet in the leg."); see also Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Products. 840 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (implausible and speculative theory about causation insufficient to raise a jury
question).
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Br. at 39, and there is compelling evidence that he did not. Cf. Eggett v. Mosier Safe Co..
730 P.2d 895,898 (Colo. App. 1986) (plaintiff s unsupported contentions regarding causation
insufficient to defeat summary judgment).
B.

Plaintiff Is N I Entitled

Heeding Presumption.

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that Lt. House would
have heeded an adequate warning <uul M led so as m nunnni "c iht risks, PI Bi ;il 39. No
such presumption applies. But even if it did, as a matter of law, It would not establish
causation in this case. The evidence here is undisputed that Lt. House, Officer Pope and
the other members of the arrest team acted to minimize risks.5
Some courts, principally in products liability cases involving pharmaceutical drugs,
have applied a "heeding presumption" to aid plaintiffs in meeting their proximate cause
burden.6 If a plaintiff can show that the drug caused the alleged injury, these courts
presume that if the injured party had been warned, the warning would have been heeded
and the drug not taken. However, the presumption always may be rebutted by evidence that
the injured party would have acted the same even if the warning had been given.7

5

Officer Pope's knowledge and conduct presents another clear reason why no
heeding presumption should apply in this case. Pope knew that his concealable torso
vest would not stop rifle fire, yet he participated in the arrest plan and took whatever
risk Lt. House did. Facts, 1111 13-14.
6

See Grover Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster. Inc.. 728 F.2d 784, 791 (6th Cir.
1984); Graham v. Wveth Laboratories. 666 F.Supp. 1483,1499 (D. Kan. 1987); Williams
v. Lederle Laboratories. 591 F.Supp. 381, 386 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Cunningham v. Charles
Pfizer & Co.. Inc.. 532 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974).
7 g ^ Williams. 591 F.Supp. at 386; Grover Hill Grain Co.. 728 F.2d at 791;
Cunningham. 532 P.2d at 1382.
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In cases applying this heeding presumption, including all of those cited by plaintiff,
see PL Br. at 39-40, two elements are always present. First, the product inflicted the injury.
Second, the plaintiff can point to some act leading to the injury, which indisputably was
taken and which an adequate warning would have prevented. For example, in drug cases,
it is undisputed that the plaintiff used the drug and that the drug caused the injury. A
presumption then arises, subject to rebuttal, that the plaintiff would have heeded an
adequate warning, and not ingested the drug thereby preventing the injury.
The presumption alone does not meet a plaintiff s burden. A plaintiff must first show
that some act was taken in reliance on the inadequate warning. Then, if the presumption
applies, the court will presume, subject to rebuttal, that the injured party would have heeded
the necessary warning and not taken the act leading to injury. Here, there is no credible
evidence that Lt. House took any action leading to his death that he would not have taken
even if the specific warnings plaintiff claims were necessary had been given.
Application of such a presumption has been far from universal. Instead, a number
of courts have rejected the heeding presumption and required the plaintiff to come forward
with evidence that the allegedly inadequate warning caused plaintiffs injury.8 No Utah
8

See Ranev v. Owens-Illinois. Inc.. 897 F.2d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting
application of a heeding presumption); Cotton. 840 F.2d 935 (no presumption applied);
Ferlito v. Johnson & Johnson. 771 F. Supp. 196, 199-200 (E.D. Mich. 1991), affd 983
R2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1992) (failure to warn not proximate cause of injury absent evidence
from plaintiff that adequate warning would have prevented harm by altering injured's
conduct); Neff v. Coleco Industries. Inc.. 760 F. Supp. 864, 868 (D. Kan. 1991), affd 961
F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1992) (no presumption applied where plaintiffs injury caused by
diving into shallow pool); Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson. Inc.. 700 F. Supp. 151,166-67
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (no presumption applied to establish causation between defendant's
allegedly inadequate warning regarding packaging of analgesic capsules tainted with
(continued...)
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court has adopted or applied a "heeding presumption"; instead Utah courts require plaintiffs
to presei it sufficient evidence of causation 9 Iliiis, the heeding presumption does not apply
in Utah.
However, even if Utah might jpply the heeding presumption in im appropriate case,
this is not it. Here, the product - Lt. House's vest - was not the injury inflicting agent. Lt.
House's injuries indisputably resulted from a rifle bullet fired bj I imothy Singer. No
warning by defendants would have prevented Singer from firing the shot which killed Lt.
House. While plaintiff contends that Lt. House may have "exposed himself to rifle fire in
reliance on his vest, she acknowledges havii lg i 10 evidence of any act of exposure taken as
a result of the allegedly inadequate warning. PI. Br. 39. In the absence of those two factors,
a heeding presumption does not provide a causal link between the Iiijin y and the allegedly
inadequate warning. Given the differing factual circumstances of this case, and the lack of
any Utah authority adopting the heeding presumption, plaintiff cannot avoid her burden of
proving causat1*

r

presumption.10

8

(...continued)
cyanide); Rilev v. American Honda Motor Co.. Inc.. 856 P.2d 196,199-200 (Mont. 1993)
(rejecting application of heeding presumption and requiring evidence which establishes
causal link between lack of warning and injuries received); Lunt v. Mount Spokane
Skiing Corp., 814 P.2d 1189,1194 (Wash. App. 1991) (plaintiff provided no evidence she
would not have continued to ski if adequate warning given).
9

See Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons. 682 P.2d 832, 836 (Utah 1984) (plaintiff
provided sufficient evidence of causation in pharmaceutical failure to warn case through
testimony that she was concerned about taking medication and doctor's testimony that
he relied on the information provided with the drug stating that it was safe; no heeding
presumption applied).
10

Plaintiff cites Koesling v. Basanakis.
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Ulan i>75), Utah R. Evid.
(continued...)

Plaintiff contends that "if Lt. House and the other officers present at Marion had
been adequately warned about the capabilities and limitations of so-called bullet proof vests,
they would have adopted a different plan that would not have exposed Lt. House and the
other officers to the same degree of risk." PL Br. at 43. While plaintiff here erroneously
suggests there is evidence indicating that none of the federal and state officers knew that
soft body armor would not stopriflefire, this telling admission acknowledges that all of the
officers, and not just Lt. House, were exposed to risk and that this was the result of the
arrest plan and not Lt. House's reliance on his vest.11 Plaintiff has no evidence upon which
a reasonable jury could infer that Lt. House knowingly exposed himself to deadly rifle fire
in the mistaken belief that his soft body armor would stop it. Plaintiff, thus, cannot establish
the critical element of proximate cause and defendants were entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law. See Eggett 730 P.2d at 898 (issue of causation may be decided on

10

(...continued)
301 and some cases from other jurisdictions in support of the general assertion that it
is for the jury to decide whether a presumption has been rebutted. PL Br. at 40.
Neither Koesling nor Rule 301 help plaintiff here; neither involve the heeding
presumption. As noted in text, no Utah court has applied the heeding presumption and
the facts here make such a presumption inapplicable. Since the presumption does not
apply in this case, the role of a jury generally in deciding whether a properly applicable
presumption has been rebutted is irrelevant. The remaining cases cited by plaintiff
involve application of the heeding presumption in jurisdictions other than Utah which
have adopted that doctrine in certain cases. They are not persuasive here both because
Utah has not adopted the presumption and because, even if adopted, it is inapplicable
in this case.
11

There is no evidence reflecting the federal officers' understanding of the
protection provided by their vests. Officer Pope, however, testified that when he "looked
into" body armor, "it was real apparent from the start that soft body armor isn't going
to stop a rifle round . . . [tjhat's why when you buy them, you get the strike plates . . .
that will stop those rifle rounds." Add. Ex. 12, Pope, R. 1422.
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summary judgment in proper case); Lunt 814 P.2d at 1194 (affirming summary judgment
for defendant on basis no proximate causation as matter of law).
II.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT LT. HOUSE DID NOT KNOW AND
SUBSTANTIAL COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT HE DID KNOW THAT SOFT
BODY ARMOR WOULD NOT STOP RIFLE FIRE
Plaintiff misleads the court, indicating that the investigation of bullet resistant vests

by Lt. House and the other Tactical Squad members consisted only of their speaking with
sales representatives and learning that vests came in different styles and with different
protection levels. PI. Br. at 6.12 The facts of their extensive investigation of vests were
stipulated to in IPTO H 23, Facts 11 16, where the plaintiff admitted that:
In 1980, the members of the Utah Prison's Tactical
Squad, all of whom were weapons instructors, determined that
they needed to obtain bullet resistant vests. The members of
these two squads began researching body armor and contacting
body armor retailers and manufacturers to obtain literature on
bullet resistant vests. They also had sales representatives visit
the prison to provide them with body armor information
including brochures and catalogs and to demonstrate bullet
resistant vests. The Tactical Squad members learned that the
vests came in a number of different styles, each with different
threat protection levels, but that they were generally of two
types, concealable vests for wear under an officer's outer
clothing, and larger non-concealable tactical vests. The Tactical
Squads' body armor investigation developed a consensus on
what vests they wanted and ultimately resulted in the purchase
from Lawco in June, 1981 of the nine Armour AHP concealable
vests and one Armour AHP Tactical vest with hard armor
ceramic insert.

12

Plaintiff further misleadingly contends that "[m]ost of what the officers knew
about vests when they bought the vests in 1981 was based on promotional materials and
portrayals of vests in the media," but then acknowledges that "[t]hey may have seen an
Armour brochure and the vest label, but neither of these conveyed sufficient
information." PI. Br. at 27.
27

This admission shows that Lt. House and the other Tactical Squad members
investigated and learned about bullet resistant vests over a period of at least six months
before deciding on the vests that they wanted to purchase. Such an investigation was to be
expected of responsible law enforcement officers who were going to request the expenditure
of significant sums to acquire protective equipment. The fact that a vest purchaser would
determine the facts about vests in order to select a particular level of protection is admitted
by plaintiff:
. . . to say that Lt. House's vest was acquired simply to protect
him from torso shots is misleading. There are a number of
different kinds of vests. All offer some protection from some
torso shots and not from others. The better the vest, the more
threats it will protect against. A purchaser acquires a particular
type of vest because he wants a particular level of protection.
PI. Br. at 45. Together, these admissions refute plaintiffs claim (PL Br. at 7,17) that there
is no evidence that Lt. House received anything other than the label on his vest to educate
him concerning soft body armor.
To accept plaintiffs claim that the Tactical Squad did not obtain Armour brochures,
one would have to believe that the brochures which plaintiff admits the Tactical Squad
obtained in the course of their investigation were all from other vest manufacturers and that
they chose Armour vests without ever seeing any Armour brochures or otherwise learning
about the protection provided by the particular vests that they decided to purchase.13 Such

13

Plaintiffs brief on page 37 misleadingly asserts without evidentiary support that
"only two members of the tactical squad even vaguely recalls seeing a brochure," and on
page 38 "[ojnly one member recalled ever seeing a brochure, . . ." On page 7, plaintiff
also alleges that only two members remembered ever seeing any brochure citing R. 2674
where Karl Bartell in fact testified the Tactical Squad received all kinds of brochures
prior to getting the vests and probably obtained brochures with the vests.
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a wholly implausible contention was directly refuted by Tactical Squad member Steve Minor
who testified that the Tactical Squad acquired brochures and catalogs from all body armor
manufacturers, including Armour, in their investigation and selection of vests. Add. Ex. 11,
Minor, R. 1399-1401. It was also refuted by Arthur Schreiber's uncontradicted testimony
that all Armour vests are enclosed in a plastic cover with an Armour brochure, and by
Wayne Wadman's uncontradicted testimony that Armour provided Lawco with a large supply
of brochures which Lawco gave to prospective vest purchasers. Add. Ex. 14, Schreiber, R.
1439; Add. Ex. 15, Wadman, R. 1458-60.14
The following material facts reflecting Lt. House's knowledge of the protection
provided by the Armour vests have been admitted by plaintiff or established by undisputed
evidence:
Lt. House was one of the "main players" in acquiring information about body armor
vests and in convincing the Warden to authorize the purchase of the ten Armour vests for
the Tactical Squads. The Tactical Squads' representatives explained to the Warden the need
for the vests, presented him with the vest manufacturers' brochures, and had a vest
representative display a vest and describe what it would do. Facts, 11 17.
The Armour brochure distributed in 1981 provided information about Armour's four
basic grades of soft body armor vests and identified the handgun rounds each grade protects
against. The grade of all ten vests acquired by the Tactical Squad was Armour Hide + P

14

Plaintiff alleges that the principals of Lawco testified that no information other
than the label accompanied the Armour vests. PL Br. at 7. They, in fact, testified only
that they could not recall any other information. R. 3343,3445. Tactical Squad member
Mark Roberts testified that he thought a pamphlet came with the vests. Add. Ex. 13,
Roberts, R. 4324.
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("AHP") which was for higher velocity handgun and submachine gun rounds identified in the
brochure. The Armour brochure describes tactical armor and explains that the AHP vest
can come with a front and back pocket for the insertion of hard armor ceramic panels to
stop rifle fire. A chart in the brochure identifies the different styles of tactical vests and the
particular rounds of handgun fire the vest will protect against and rifle fire that the hard
armor panels will protect against. Facts, 1111 20, 21 and 22; Add. Ex. 3, Brochure, R. 1326.
Contrary to plaintiffs contentions, even the selective evidence plaintiff cites shows
clearly that the Tactical Squad members knew that soft body armor would not stop rifle fire,
that Lt. House's AHP tactical vest provided the same protection as their vests and the
ceramic plate in Lt. House's vest would withstand a rifle round up to a 30.06. PL Br. 11-13.
First, plaintiff quotes the testimony of Steve Minor that Lt. House's vest had approximately
the same stopping power as Minor's vest which was up to a .44 caliber pistol and that high
caliber rifle bullets had to hit Lt. House's plate or they would penetrate. Add. Ex. 11, S.
Minor, R. 2774-77. Second, plaintiff quotes Lynn Jorgensen's testimony that without the
plate Lt. House's vest would not stop rounds from long barrel guns or rifles. Add. Ex. 9, L.
Jorgensen, R. 1387. Third, plaintiff quotes Wayne Jorgensen that Lt. House's vest would
not stop rifle fire without the plate. Add. Ex. 10, W. Jorgensen, R. 1395. Finally, plaintiff
quotes Karl Bartell that he knew Lt. House's vest would not stop a 30.06 without the plate.
Add. Ex. 20, PL Memo, R. 1517; Add. Ex. 6, Bartell, R. 2629.15

15

Plaintiff erroneously alleges that Wayne Jorgensen and Lt. House attended a
demonstration in which Lt. House fired "a fully automatic 9mm carbine" at a vest and
none of the bullets penetrated. PL Br. at 12,13. Wayne Jorgensen testified that it was
"a fully automatic 9mm submachine gun," not a carbine, (Add. Ex. 10, W. Jorgensen, R.
(continued...)
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(...continued)
4234), bullets from which can be stopped by Armour's AHP soft body armor. Facts 11
20, 23. Plaintiff also misleadingly cites Robert Larson (PI. Br. 13) who was testifying
about the "thick ballistic plate", in the vest, when he stated "we thought that would stop
anything." R. 1514.
Other testimony, not cited by plaintiff, further establishes that Tactical Squad
members knew that soft body armor stops only handgun rounds and that Lt. House's
hard armor plate was needed to stop rifle fire:
"Q: That is what you are talking about when you are talking about the kind of
weapons this soft body armor will stop-handguns?
A: Right. Correct." Add. Ex. 11, S. Minor, R. 2791.
"Q: And what was your understanding of the other differences between your
vest and Fred's vest?
A: Fred's vest was physically different. I mean, you know, it was longer and
wider and went down. I thought it went down more towards his solar plexus and
groin area. And it had a compartment to - it was my understanding that it met
our standards. But if he put these plates in it, then, you know, it would withstand
a long gun round up to a 30-06. You know, for some reason we centered on 3006." Add. Ex. 9, L. Jorgensen, R. 4630-31.
"Q: Right. Fred knew that the plate would stop rifle fire? Right?
A: Yes.
Q: 30.06?
A: And lower, right." Add. Ex. 6, Bartell, R. 1360.
f,

Q: The stopping power of Lt. House's vest, its ability to stop rifle fire,
depended upon it having the ceramic or steel insert in place; isn't that correct?
A: What little I know of his particular vest, yes, the trauma plate would need to
be there.
Q: And would he [Lt. House] have had that knowledge as well, in your opinion?
A: Yes." Add. Ex. 10, W. Jorgensen, R. 1392-93.
"Q: Right. You knew your vest wouldn't stop rifle fire?
/\. i es. . . .
Q: You knew that the remainder of Fred's vest, the back of it, or that without the
insert, wouldn't stop the rifle fire?
A: Well, the only thing that - We just felt that when Fred went in, whatever he
took on up to what we had, that vest was going to stop it. If it was a rifle, it
(continued...)
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Although Tactical Squad members testified that they knew that only Lt. House's plate
would stop rifle fire, plaintiff nevertheless argues that Lt House did not know what his
tactical vest, and particularly the hard armor ceramic insert, would do even though they were
specially acquired for him at a much greater cost to provide additional protection. To
believe that other Squad members understood that only the hard armor panel would stop
rifle fire but Lt. House - who had the panel - did not, is simply incredible.16
More importantly, Lynn Jorgensen and Steve Minor were in fact told by Lt House
that he knew his ceramic plate was necessary to stop rifle fire:
Q:
. . . is it your understanding that Lt. House's vest would stop those
threat levels if the bullet did not strike the ceramic or steel plate insert?
A:
It was my understanding that the vest would not stop some of those
rounds if it did not strike the metal plate.
Q:
The rounds that it would not stop would be rounds shot from longbarreled guns or rifles; is that correct?
A:

That's correct.

Q:
So if some of these rounds were shot from short-barreled weapons, you
would anticipate that they may be stopped by the soft part of the body armor
as opposed to the ceramic plate?
A:

That's correct.

Q:
Do you have an opinion whether Lt. House shared your view that
you've just expressed of his vest's bullet-stopping capabilities?

15

(...continued)
seemed like that it would have to hit the ceramic plate or the plate. The plate
would stop a rifle." Add. Ex. 7, Billings, R. 1367.

16

Plaintiff has admitted that she must "rely upon other tactical squad members'
knowledge and understanding concerning the capabilities and limitations of Lt. House's
vest to infer what Lt House knew." Add. Ex. 20, PL Memo. R. 1510.
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A:

Yes. I do.

Q:

And what is that opinion?

A:
On occasions Fred would pull the plates out when we'd go do various
operations, and in listening to him talk about the plates, I believe he felt that
his vest without the plates had the same ballistic capabilities as did the rest of
the SWAT team members.
Q:

Which was that it would stop handguns but not rifles; is that correct?

A:

.44 magnum or less handguns, yes.

Q:

But not rifles?

A:

But not rifles.

Q:
Based upon your conversations with Lt. House then, you believe it was
his understanding that the plate was necessary in order to stop rifle fire?
A:

Yes.
*

*

*

Q.
Your understanding of what Lt. House knew about the bullet-stopping
capabilities of his vest, is it true that it's that knowledge is based upon what
the people in the SWAT team knew generally, common knowledge if you will?
*

*

*

A.
I would answer yes, in that a lot of the exercises that we would
participate in, if it was very close quarters, a lot of building clearing, that Fred
would take the plates out, and as we would talk about it, you know, we would
reason out that the probability of someone having a long gun in there was
minimal, and we would probably be up against shotguns and handguns.
Yet when we would go out to Camp Williams and do run-and-shoot
exercises out, you know, even though we might be operating in a 50 yard area,
Fred would always put the plates in, because he would be so much more open
to being hit from a long gun. A long gun could get to him in those types of
scenarios.
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Add. Ex. 9, L. Jorgensen, R. 1387-89, 1792-93 (emphasis added.)
Q:

And what did you understand about the stopping capacity of that vest?

A:
Just through what Fred said and what the others were talking about.
Again, I didn't see any information that it would stop anything. It would stop
a high powered rifle unless it was armor-piercing special bullets made by
Russia, or somebody, then it might be different, but that's all I ever heard.
Q:

Now would high powered rifles have to hit it straight for it to stop it?

A:
Yes, that's my understanding, was if you hit the plate, then it would
stop it. If it didn't hit the plate, then it would penetrate past that.
Q:
Without the plate, the vest had approximately the same stopping
capacity as A:

As mine.

Q:

-as your vest?

A:

Correct.

Add. Ex. 11, S. Minor, R. 2776-77 (emphasis added.)
This testimony establishes that Lt. House knew that only the hard armor ceramic insert
would protect him from rifle fire and that his soft body armor would not.
Plaintiff cites Tactical Squad members stating that Lt. House acted differently after
he got the vest, that he always wore his vest, and that he acted like superman when wearing
the vest. PI. Br. at 42. However, this testimony referred to "rough housing" between Lt.
House and other Squad members, not to law enforcement operations. Add. Ex. 10, W.
Jorgensen, R. 1795-96. In regard to Lt. House's performance when on duty, the Squad
members described him as being a well-trained, level headed law enforcement officer with
a lot of common sense who knew what he was doing and the limitations of his equipment.
Add. Ex. 12, Pope, R. 2392. Add. Ex. 10, W. Jorgensen, R. 1796-97.
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These comments become even more significant in light of Tom House's testimony
about his investigation of his brother's death and his conclusion that no officer involved in
the arrest plan was exposing himself to any hostile fire:
Q:
. . . didn't you learn that Jerry Pope and Fred House were there at the
entryway to release their dogs and then immediately seek cover, so that the
FBI Hostage Rescue Team members, who were also in the entryway with their
weapons prepared to provide cover and protection, could fire unobstructedly?
A:
I've come to an understanding that indeed no member of that force was
exposing himself to any fire. The plan and the positioning was to indeed not
expose themselves to fire, hostile fire.
Q:

And how did you come to learn that?

A:
Indeed with my training as a SWAT team member, my repetitive
practice of those concepts, and indeed my review of where people were and
what the original plan was as depicted by some of those folks that were
actually there, there was a conscious effort to preclude, or if not entirely
preclude, to minimize to the greatest degree possible, any exposure of law
enforcement, this tactical team, to hostile fire.
Q:

And that's standard procedure with hostile things; is it not?

A:

Yes.

Add. Ex. 8, T. House, R. 1383-84 (emphasis added).17
Plaintiff finally suggests that because there was no label on the hard armor ceramic
plate or any indication on the label of the vest that the plate was necessary to stop rifle fire,
Lt. House was unaware of this fact. PL Br. at 36. This has no evidentiary support and is
refuted by the facts that Lt. House played a major role in investigating and acquiring the

17

This testimony and Officer Pope's testimony that he knew that his vest would not
stop rifle fire directly refute the contention that if the limitations of "bullet proof vests"
had been known, a different plan would have been adopted that would not have exposed
"Lt. House and the other officers to the same degree of risk." PL Br. at 43.
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body armor for the Tactical Squads, that a large tactical vest affording special protection was
acquired for him at a cost of $750 (nearly four times the cost of the concealable vests) and
that this special protection consisted of an expensive and heavy hard armor ceramic panel.
Why, if the vest would stop rifle fire, was the expensive and heavy hard armor panel needed.
It is beyond belief that Lt. House did not know the protection afforded by his vest and
particularly that this hard armor ceramic panel was necessary to stop rifle fire when this was
known by the other squad members. The vest label, rather than creating a misleading
impression that the vest would do more than it could and even stop rifle fire, (PL Br. 36)
did just the opposite. The label indicated that the vest could only contain certain rounds
from short barreled weapons or handguns even though with the hard armor ceramic panel
inserted, that area of the vest provided protection from rifle fire.
III.

NEITHER ARMOUR NOR DuPONT HAD A DUTY TO GIVE LT. HOUSE THE
WARNINGS CONTENDED BY PLAINTIFF18
A.

Defendants Had No Duty To Warn As Contended In Light Of The
Sophistication And Knowledge Of The Intended User Group

Plaintiff mistakenly indicates that defendants claim they had no duty to warn because
Lt. House and his co-workers were sophisticated users of vests. PI. Br. at 25. In fact,

18

Whether a duty to warn exists is a question of law for the court. German v, F.
L. Smithe Mach. Co.. 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986) (citing Restatement fSecond^)
of Torts § 328B(b) (1965)). Plaintiff cites Graham v. Rverson. 292 N.W.2d 704 (Mich.
App. 1980) for the proposition that even where the user group is expert, whether there
is a duty to warn may still be a question of fact. However, Graham notes the question
of duty is generally a question of law for the court, that question only went to the jury
in Graham because a number of factual disputes existed regarding plaintiffs knowledge
of the dangerous condition. Here the undisputed facts show that Lt. House and the
other Tactical Squad members were aware of the two specific warnings plaintiff claims
should have been given, thus the question of duty was for the court.
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defendants1 position is that specific warnings on the vest's label that the vest would not stop
rifle fire and that the users should not rely on the vest are not required because of the
knowledge and sophistication of these officers. Lt. House and the other Tactical Squad
members indisputably were specially trained prison officers who were also weapons
instructors.19 Thus, they were familiar with weapons, bullets and the type of threats that
law enforcement officers, Tactical Squads and SWAT teams face in the line of duty. They
therefore naturally would investigate the protection afforded by body armor and make an
informed decision as to the level of protection they needed.
As plaintiff admits: "A purchaser acquires a particular type of vest because he wants
a particular level of protection." PL Br. at 45. Moreover, the uncontested facts show that
Lt. House and other Tactical Squad members conducted an extensive investigation of body
armor, as outlined above at pp. 27-30. Plaintiff also admits that from this investigation the
Squad members learned that vests come in a number of different styles and different threat
protection levels and that this investigation resulted in the purchase of the nine concealable
vests and one tactical vest with a hard armor insert. PL Br. at 6. This is the type of
information that law enforcement officers who are about to purchase vests reasonably would
be expected to obtain.20 For plaintiff to argue, in light of these facts, that there is no
evidence that Lt. House received anything other than the label on his vest to educate him

19

Some of the special training courses Lt. House completed, including Officer
Survival and SWAT training, are set forth in the Facts, 11 15.
20

Officer Pope provides another example of a typical officer's investigation before
purchasing a bullet resistant vest. Officer Pope testified that he obtained information
about a number of vests and the level of protection they provided before he decided on
which vest to purchase. Facts 11 14.
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concerning soft body armor, PL Br. at 35-36, is simply disingenuous.
Plaintiffs contention that Lt. House did not realize the limitations of his vest because
the vest label was the only information given to him is also implausible as well as contrary
to the uncontested facts. The label in Lt. House's vest was identical to the labels in the
other Squad members' concealable vests and these labels on all of the ten Armour vests
made it clear that the soft body armor provided only limited protection and specifically that
if three of the five handgun bullets identified on the label were fired from a barrel longer
than six inches, then the vest would not stop the bullets. Facts, 11 5. The obvious and only
differences in protection between Lt. House's AHP tactical vest and the nine AHP
concealable vests were the hard armor ceramic plate that could be inserted in the front
pocket of Lt. House's vest and the coverage of the sides of his chest, which the concealable
vests did not provide.
Finally, as a law enforcement officer, Lt. House knew that he could not control
threats directed toward him, and that those threats may include fire from high powered guns
or fire directed toward any part of his body.

Thus, it is unnecessary to warn law

enforcement officers not to rely unqualifiedly on their bullet resistant vests for protection.
B.

Defendants Had No Duty To Warn As Contended Because Of The
Obviousness Of The Vest's Limited Protection

Plaintiff contends defendants had a duty to warn Lt. House that he should take no
action with his vest on that he would not take without it. PI. Br. at 28. But Armour and
DuPont had no such duty in light of the obvious fact that a bullet fired at Lt. House could
cause injury or death whatever the threat protection level offered by his vest because it did
not cover his head, neck, arms, armpits, groin or lower extremities. This limited protection
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and the need to act with the same caution while wearing the vest as without it are both
readily apparent. As Tom House admitted, even with his vest on he always faced a serious
risk of injury because the vest covered only his torso and he could be shot elsewhere. Add.
Ex. 8, T. House, R. 1376.
Under Utah law there is no duty to warn of the obvious, readily recognizable danger
of exposing oneself to rifle fire or, indeed to any ballistic threat.21 If Lt. House exposed
himself to rifle fire, he could not be certain where he might be hit. The risk of being struck
anywhere from exposure to rifle fire is open and obvious. It is something law enforcement
officers are particularly trained to avoid, as would any reasonable person.
Tom House admitted that law officers are trained to minimize any exposure to hostile
fire to the greatest degree possible. Add. Ex. 8, T. House, R. 1383-84. This is why it is

21

See Model Utah Jury Instruction 12.6 (Alternative A). Plaintiff argues that Utah
law is unclear regarding whether the open and obvious defense exists as demonstrated
by a division of opinion in the Utah Jury Instruction Revision Committee which drafted
the duty to warn instructions. PL Br. at 27. See Model Utah Jury Instruction 12.7
(Alternative B), Comments. The division plaintiff refers to arose out of Donahue v.
Durfee. 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah App. 1989), in which the court of appeals held the open
and obvious danger rule is not an absolute bar to a landowner liability action under
Utah's comparative negligence system, but instead simply goes to whether the plaintiff
has any fault or negligence. Some members of the Committee felt that Donahue, a
landowner liability case, is applicable in a products liability action. Plaintiff cites only
one case decided under Indiana law in which the court found the open and obvious
defense inapplicable to a strict liability claim. Numerous other courts have recognized
and applied this defense in strict liability claims. See Wheeler v. John Deere Co.. 862
F.2d 1404,1413 (10th Cir. 1988); Hagans v. Oliver Machinery Co.. 576 F.2d 97,102 (5th
Cir. 1978). More importantly, both alternate jury instructions drafted by the committee
state that a duty to warn only arises where the danger "would not be readily recognized
by the ordinary user of the product." Model Utah Jury Instructions 12.6 & 12.7. Thus,
under Utah law, regardless of whether the open and obvious defense exists, a duty to
warn only arises where the danger is one which the ordinary person would not readily
recognize.
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unnecessary to warn law enforcement officers that they should take no action with a vest on
that they would not take without it. The law does not impose a duty to warn of open and
obvious or readily recognizable dangers such as intentionally exposing oneself to hostile fire.
See Wilson v. Bicycle South. Inc.. 915 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1990) (obvious that protective
gear only protects that part of body which it covers); Linegar v. Armour of America, 909
F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1990) (limited nature of protection offered by bullet resistant vest
obvious).
Here, the undisputed evidence establishes that the Tactical Squad members were
trained never to expose themselves to danger unnecessarily. The undisputed evidence also
establishes that the Tactical Squad members learned from the investigation of bullet resistant
vests that vests are made with different threat protection levels and that soft body armor will
not stop rifle fire. Given these facts, it was unnecessary for Armour to make available any
more information about its vests than it did. DuPont, without any knowledge about or
connection with the manufacture and sale of Lt. House's tactical vest, clearly had no duty
or opportunity to make any warning.
IV.

ARMOUR SATISFIED ANY DUTY TO WARN IT MAY HAVE HAD
Plaintiff cannot dispute that the adequacy of a warning is judged in light of the

knowledge and expertise of the intended user group - here law enforcement officers - and
that warnings need to be simple and succinct enough to be readable and effective. See, e.g.,
Liesener v. Weslo. Inc., 775 F. Supp. 857, 861 (D. Md. 1991).
The undisputed evidence shows that Armour, the manufacturer, provided Lawco, the
retailer, with information and brochures concerning Armour vests so that Lawco could
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convey the information and brochures to prospective customers. Facts 11 2. Armour also
enclosed a copy of its brochure containing detailed information regarding the capabilities
of Armour's soft body armor vests and hard body armor panels inside the plastic cover that
encased all of its vests so that the brochure would be received by all vest purchasers.
Armour also placed a simple and succinct label in all of its vests which identified the vest's
ballistic protection level by listing the maximum or top-end rounds that the vest would
contain. Facts, 11 1. The label listed five handgun bullets with three of the bullets
specifically limited to a six-inch barrel length and buckshot fired from a shotgun. Facts, 11
5.22 The Armour brochure contained a chart which specifically identified the bullets that
the soft body armor would contain and the rifle bullets the hard armor ceramic panel would
contain. Facts, 11 22. The brochure and the short barrel limitations on the label made it
clear that soft body armor would contain certain hand gun bullets but not rifle fire and that
a hard armor panel insert was needed to stop rifle fire.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the adequacy of the warning is clear. See.
e.g., Liesener. 775 F. Supp. at 860-61 (warning adequate as a matter of law).23 All of the

22

One of these three bullets limited to six inch barrels is the .44 magnum round that
plaintiff claims indicates a "threat level III vest" according to NIJ standards which should
also stop a 30.06 and a .30 caliber carbine. PL Br. 8,35. Plaintiff cites the NIJ standard
including R. 1574 where it is stated that test weapons for Type III vests are rifles with
barrel lengths of 22 inches, indicating that these vests contain hard armor inserts.
23

While plaintiff cites cases where some courts have found a jury question existed
regarding the adequacy of defendant's warning, none of these cases hold that the
adequacy of a warning can never be decided as a matter of law. In fact, in Bickram v.
Case I.H.. 712 F. Supp. 18,22 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), the court specifically acknowledged that
a warning case may be decided as a matter of law where the danger is obvious or one
which the user should be aware of through common sense.
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information provided by Armour to retailers and purchasers, together with the fact that
purchasers do not just pick vests off a shelf, but inform themselves about the threat
protection level which a particular vest will provide before purchasing it, clearly shows that
Armour fulfilled any duty to warn which it owed Lt. House.
V.

DuPONT HAD NEITHER ANY DUTY NOR ANY OPPORTUNITY TO WARN LTHOUSE REGARDING HIS ARMOUR TACTICAL VEST
The uncontested material facts establish (1) that DuPont, the manufacturer of a fiber

processed by others into ballistic fabric used in bullet resistant vests, had no duty or
opportunity to inform all vest wearers of their vest's threat protection levels; and (2) that if
DuPont undertook any duty by providing information and encouraging the use of soft body
armor, it was only a duty to provide accurate information which it fulfilled. These facts are
as follows:
DuPont did not develop Kevlar® fiber for ballistic fabric and has never designed or
manufactured soft or hard body armor. DuPont sells Kevlar® fiber to weaving companies,
which weave the fiber into ballistic fabric according to specifications from body armor
manufacturers. Soft body armor is constructed of multiple layers of this woven fabric
assembled into a ballistic resistant panel which is inserted into a carrier of conventional
garment fabric such as nylon or cotton. The ballistic protection level is determined by the
weave and number of layers of fabric which the vest manufacturer utilizes in the ballistic
panel. The manufacturer's final products consist of different styles and grades of bullet
resistant vests providing various levels of protection determined by the manufacturers' tests.
Facts, 11 23-27.
DuPont has published and widely disseminated to manufacturers of body armor and
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interested law enforcement organizations free of charge thousands of copies of body armor
Facts Books each year beginning with 1985. All of these DuPont Facts Books inform the
reader that soft body armor made with Kevlar®fiberdoes not provide protection from rifle
fire. Facts, 11 29. Add. Ex. 4, R. 1334. Officer Pope received one of these Facts Books with
the purchase of his vest in 1986 further evidencing their extensive distribution. Facts, 11 14.
DuPont has disseminated several video tapes concerning soft body armor. All of
these video tapes advise that soft body armor made with Kevlar® fiber will not protect
against rifle fire. Facts, 11 30.
Plaintiff can present no evidence that any of DuPont's statements regarding soft body
armor were false or misleading or that Lt. House ever saw or heard them. PL Br. 11, 19.24
Plaintiff does not dispute these facts. But she contends that DuPont is one of the
most active and visible players in the soft body armor industry, citing its membership in the
24

Plaintiff erroneously claims a DuPont video entitled "Protecting Society's
Protectors" showed that a threat level III vest would stop rifle fire but did not mention
the need for hard armor inserts. PL Br. at 38, citing L. Jorgensen's deposition.
However, on R. 4654 of this deposition, counsel clarified that the video being discussed
was not DuPont's "Protecting Society's Protectors." More importantly, plaintiff has
stipulated that DuPont's videos all "advised the viewer that no soft body armor made of
Kevlar® will protect against rifle fire." IPTO 1118, Add. Ex. 1, R. 1290. Plaintiff also
claims DuPont helped perpetuate misinformation because it funded the Fraternal Order
of Police Auxiliary's (FOPA) Vested Interest Program which distributed in 1989 a poster
comparing an officer wearing a vest to Superman. PL Br. at 20, 39. While there is
evidence that DuPont provided funds to the FOPA to assist its efforts to get police
officers to wear their body armor, the evidence indicated that DuPont had nothing to do
with this particular FOPA poster released in 1989, after Lt. House's death. Add. Ex. 16,
Bachner, R. 2311-13; Add. Ex. 18, L. Miner, R. 2102-04. DuPont's Lou Miner also
refuted plaintiffs claim that defendants knew that some officers thought their vests made
them Supermen. PL Br. at 28. Mr. Miner testified that an Aerospace Corporation
questionnaire to 5,000 police officers conclusively established that vest wearers did not
get the Superman complex and were not more reckless or aggressive. Add. Ex. 18, L.
Miner, R. 2100.
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Personal Protective Armor Association ("PPAA"), its testing of vests, and its funding of
studies to determine how to increase vest use and of certain law enforcement organizations
which encourage officers to wear their vests. PI. Br. at S3.25 DuPont admittedly has
extensively tested ballistic fabrics woven from Kevlar® fiber and has encouraged law
enforcement officers to wear vests for their protection. DuPont has encouraged the
responsible marketing of soft body armor by manufacturers through its active participation
as a member of the Personal Protective Armor Association since 1983 whose activities
include the development of ethical standards for vest manufacturers, labeling standards and
testing standards. PL Br. at 8. DuPont also performed testing of used soft body armor and,
as a result, has disseminated recommendations for a rational replacement policy for used
vests. DuPont and certain vest manufacturers also tried to get the National Institute of
Justice ("NIJ") to make certain changes in its vest testing procedures. Facts, 11 31. These
DuPont activities took place years after Lt. House's vest was purchased in 1981 and some
even after his death in January, 1988.26
25

Plaintiff acknowledges that a PPAA testing standard developed by DuPont,
Armour and others states that "at a minimum a label should state that the armor is not
intended to protect the wearer from rifle fire," citing the standard but neglecting to note
that it was dated June 22, 1989. Plaintiff also acknowledges that DuPont suggested to
the National Institute of Justice in 1984 that labels should contain warnings that vests
will not contain rifle fire. PL Br. at 8.
26

DuPont participated with the PPAA in the development of improved testing
standards for soft body armor and in 1988 and 1989 lobbied federal agencies for
modification of testing standards. It was at this time that the letter was written that
plaintiff relies upon to misleadingly contend that DuPont controls who can make vests
out of Kevlar®, forces manufacturers to test in accordance with the PPAA .05 standard
and refuses to sell Kevlar® to manufacturers who insist upon following the higher NIJ
standards. PL Br. at 19,32. This letter, written by DuPont's employee Thomas Bachner
(continued...)
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The undisputed facts show that almost all of DuPontfs activities which plaintiff
contends created a general duty to warn - i.e., disseminating Facts Books and other
information about soft body armor and funding studies concerning police officers' attitudes,
perceptions and behavior toward soft body armor - took place in the mid and late 1980s.
Thus, to the extent DuPont undertook any duty by reason of these activities in the body
armor field, that duty did not arise before the mid-1980's, long after Lt. House's vest was
purchased in 1981. See Estate of Kimmel v. Clark Equipment Co., 773 F. Supp. 828, 830-31
(W.D. Va. 1991) (existence of duty to warn evaluated at time product is manufactured and
sold).
Plaintiff argues that DuPont knew that officers did not know as much as they should
have known about vests and their limitations. PI. Br. at 32. There is no evidence that
DuPont had any information of consumer knowledge before it funded the Brand studies in
1986 which revealed that "most police officers are aware that rifle bullets and certain high
velocity, high-powered bullets can indeed go through soft body armor." PL Br. at 16. The
testimony of all Tactical Squad members (except Tom House) confirmed this officer
knowledge by establishing that they all knew in 1981 that their soft body armor would not

26

(...continued)
on July 21, 1989, one and a half years after Lt. House's death, announced an intent by
DuPont to discontinue the unconditional sale of Kevlar® fiber for fabric intended for
ballistic vests to be certified as meeting the NIJ voluntary standards and to require for
such vests the heavier and more rigid construction needed to consistently pass the NIJ
standards. This letter was written in connection with a concern that DuPont and a
number of vest manufacturers then had that NIJ testing procedures were flawed and
produced incorrect results. However, the letter was never mailed and no DuPont
requirements were ever implemented. See Add. Ex. 16, Bachner, R. 2318-2319; Add.
Ex. 18, L. Miner, R. 2057-58, 2063; Add. Ex. 14, Schreiber, R. 1454.
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stop rifle fire.
Plaintiff argues that DuPont, even if simply a component manufacturer, can be liable
for failure to warn of the limitations of its component part or the damages that may result
from a foreseeable use of its product. However, the cases cited by plaintiff are inapplicable
here and do not support any duty on DuPont to warn users of soft body armor about the
protection limitations of their particular vests.27
DuPont is essentially a bulk supplier of Kevlar® fiber. The fiber itself cannot be
labeled. It is transformed into ballistic fabric by knowledgeable weavers and is made into
bullet resistant vests by knowledgeable manufacturers. As a bulk supplier, DuPont has no
duty and no ability to warn an ultimate vest user about the different body armor vests with
varying protection levels that are manufactured and sold by numerous vest manufacturers.28
27

In Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 715 (5th Cir. 1986),
the court rejected an argument by the defendant that its safety suit designed to protect
the wearer from fire was a component part of an integrated safety system. Oak Grove
Investors v. Bell & Gossett Co.. 668 P.2d 1075,1080 (Nev. 1983), simply held that strict
liability may be imposed on a manufacturer of certain fittings for failure to warn of the
dangers of increased water velocity caused by the fittings. Plaintiff also cites Wessinger
v. Vetter Corp.. 716 F. Supp. 537 (D. Kan. 1989), for the proposition that a defendant
may have a duty to warn about products it did not manufacture and which represent a
modification of the defendant's product. In Wessinger. the court found it was
foreseeable that a fairing might be installed on a motorcycle, and therefore the jury
could find a manufacturer obligated to warn of the motorcycle's characteristic with the
fairing on. Here, DuPont did not manufacture or market any finished product but
simply the raw fiber from which ballistic fabric is made.
28

Plaintiff cites Products Liability: Duty of Manufacturer or Seller of Component
Part Incorporated in Another Product to Warn of Dangers. 39 A.L.R.4th 6, 13 (1985)
for the proposition that rules governing the liability of a manufacturer of a complete
product for failure to warn are equally applicable to the manufacturer of a component
part. In fact, this annotation makes clear that the general rule - that there is no duty
to warn that a product, not in itself dangerous, might conceivably cause injury - will bar
(continued...)
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DuPont has no control over or knowledge of the weaving of its fiber into different ballistic
fabrics for various vest manufacturers, the level of protection of the completed vests, the
purchasers of the vests or the information provided to the purchasers. Facts, 11 27.
Moreover, Armour and Lawco both knew that soft body armor made from Kevlar® fiber
would not stop rifle fire. These facts negate any duty on DuPont, as a bulk supplier of fiber,
to warn a vest purchaser. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Homasote Co.. 719 F. Supp. 417, 420 (D.
Md. 1989) (bulk supplier of even a dangerous product to a sophisticated purchaser cannot
be liable for not warning the ultimate users of the product's dangers). See also Veil v. Vitek.
Inc.. 803 F.Supp. 229, 235-237 (D.N.D. 1992) (supplier of raw material, not inherently
dangerous, has no duty to warn ultimate consumer in connection with product manufactured
from raw material); Higgins v. E.I DuPont de Nemours. Inc.. 671 F.Supp. 1055, 1061-62
(D.Md. 1987) (bulk supplier of chemicals used to make paint not liable as a matter of law
for warning ultimate consumer of dangers associated with the use of the paint).
There is no evidence indicating that Armour, Lawco or anyone in the bullet resistant
vest industry did not know that soft body armor would not stop rifle fire or that this

^(...continued)
recovery from a manufacturer of the component part which was not inherently
dangerous. Further, the annotation defines the term "component" to embrace only
identifiable parts to the exclusion of items such as raw materials like fibers which are
transformed or processed during the course of manufacture. Moreover, a component
manufacturer has no duty to warn if the component part is not defective. See Searls v.
Doe. 29 Ohio App. 2d 309,505 N.E.2d 287 (1986) (component manufacturer has no duty
to warn of dangers in finished product when the component part is not defective); Lee
v. Butcher Bov. 169 Cal. App. 3d 375, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1985) (manufacturer of
finished product rather than supplier of component part is in best position to warn of
danger that arises after the non-defective component part is installed in finished
product).
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information was not being conveyed by vest sellers to vest purchasers. Armour and Lawco
both claim these facts are true.29 DuPont, with no information to the contrary, had no duty
to warn. In any event, DuPont fulfilled any duty it may have had or may have undertaken
by disseminating its Facts Books and video tapes which accurately informed that soft body
armor will not stop rifle fire. Facts, 11 29, 30.
DuPont is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claims because (1) it had no
duty to warn about soft body armor; (2) it had no opportunity to warn each vest user; (3)
it had no knowledge about any particular vest that would be needed to provide accurate
information to a vest user about the protection provided by the vest; and (4) it did provide
accurate information about soft body armor to vest manufacturers and police organizations
that specifically advised that this armor would not protect against rifle fire.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff cannot establish the essential elements of her failure to warn claim that (1)
Armour claims that law enforcement officers who acquire and wear soft body
armor are informed and know that it will not stop rifle fire and the law enforcement
officers who acquire and wear tactical vests know that only hard armor inserts like the
ceramic panel that was inserted in the front of Lt. House's vest are capable of stopping
rifle fire. Armour claims that the label that was attached to Lt. House's vest indicated
that the soft body armor would only protect against some handguns and buckshot and
that a brochure which accompanied the vest made clear that high velocity rifle fire
protection was only provided by the hard armor ceramic panel. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO, R.
1278.
Lawco claims that the Department of Corrections personnel interested in
acquiring bullet resistant vests were informed and knew that the nine concealable vests
would not contain rifle fire and that only the hard armor ceramic panel would do so, by
reason of extensive information about bullet resistant vests provided to them both prior
to and at the time of their purchase of these Armour vests. Some of this information
was contained in the Armour brochure which both Lawco and Armour provided all vest
purchasers and in the label attached to each Armour vest. Add. Ex. 1, IPTO, R. 1279.
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specific warnings to Lt. House that soft body armor will not stop rifle fire and that he should
do nothing with his vest on that he would not do without it were necessary to make his vest
reasonably safe; (2) Armour and DuPont had duties to give such specific warnings to Lt.
House; (3) Armour and/or DuPont breached their respective duties; and (4) because of their
breaches, Lt. House was killed by knowingly exposing himself to deadly rifle fire in the
mistaken belief that his soft body armor would stop it.
The district court's decision dismissing plaintiffs claims should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of October, 1993.
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